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What’s a poor biomedical reporter to
do when entire television networks
and newspapers turn their undivided
attention to suicidal terrorist pilots?
Forget the scientific journals. Those
stories won’t run. Try another stem-
cell story? Not unless it’s a terrorist
cell. No, the solution is to scare the
living daylights out of everybody. 
It’s called following the news.
And what better way than to ponder
even more horrible things that
haven’t happened to people but
which could. The Washington Post got
out in front of this story bright and
early, while the frantic search for
bodies at the smoldering World
Trade Center was still under way. 
“It would require just a small
private plane, not a hijacked
commercial jetliner. A helper could
casually dump a bag of powdery
bacterial spores while in flight, rather
than having to overpower a planeload
of passengers. And the team could
land and be home in time for dinner
instead of ending it all in a suicidal
inferno,” The Post reported. “Anyone
with a cough would be a weapon,”
Michael Olsterholm, director of the
University of Minnesota’s Center for
Infectious Disease Research and
Policy, told the paper. But this story
ran before there was even a hint of
such of a possibility — before we
learned that Mohamed Atta had
wandered around Florida, asking
questions about crop-dusters. And
the Post was by no means alone. 
Dean Wilkening at Stanford told
the San Francisco Chronicle that bin
Laden could buy a germ warfare
weapon from a rogue state like Iraq
or disaffected Russian scientists. “It
might be a very small weapon,
unlikely to cause a million
casualties,” Wilkening said, “but
10,000 to 50,000 is more realistic.” 
Newsday, on New York’s Long
Island also rang alarm bells. “No one
is in charge. They don’t have
anybody expert in biosciences and
public health, as far as the eye can
see in this administration,” Tara
O’Toole, deputy director of the
Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies at Johns Hopkins — and a
former Clinton Administration
official — told the paper. 
Some readers were not very
happy with this descent into fear.
Readers complained to the
Washington Post that the information
was too specific. For example, the
Post reported advice from a crop-
dusting service about the best nozzle
to use with bacteriological weapons.
“I was surprised [another] article
didn’t also include contact
information for research and
pathology laboratories known to
produce such spores,” one letter
writer complained sarcastically. 
Coverage — and anxiety —
ratcheted up as the crop-duster story
unfolded, and when one newspaper
employee in Florida died of
inhalation anthrax and sporadic
exposures were reported in that
office and elsewhere in the US. At
this writing, it’s not clear whether
these are related to terrorism. 
Curiously, writers who don’t
specialize in biomedicine often had a
much less frightening view of an
attack with biological weapons. A
close look at the news sources
explains this difference. Naturally,
science writers often relied heavily
on people from the world of public
health. The story from their
perspective is that the system is not
prepared to handle an attack. Indeed,
they’ve been pleading for more
money for years. Scholars who study
the history of bioterrorism, on the
other hand, see a string of failures
and difficulties. 
The New York Times reassured its
readers with this: “Experts say that
biological weapons, with few
exceptions, are hard to make and use.
In the early 1990s, Aum Shinriko, a
Japanese cult, launched germ attacks
in and around Tokyo that were
meant to kill millions. The strikes
produced no known injuries or
deaths,” Jonathan Tucker, a germ-
weapons expert at the Monterey
Institute of International Studies told
the Times, “there are greater risks of
dying on the highway than from
exposure to anthrax”. 
The Financial Times was similarly
reassuring. “Biological weapons have
an apocalyptic reputation. But they
are often ineffective in spreading
disease,” ran one headline. In that
opinion piece, Henry Miller at the
Hoover Institution wrote that anthrax
doesn’t spread well from person to
person and highly infectious
epidemics are generally self limiting. 
Ultimately, journalists covering this
story face the same problem as
everybody else does. As the Los Angeles
Times put it, “A bioweapons attack
using an agent like smallpox is almost
impossible to imagine. As we now
know, that’s no reason to dismiss it.” 
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Mediawatch: Richard Harris reports on the journalists quickly raising
fears of terrorism by biological weapons in the wake of the attacks
in New York and Washington on September 11.
